# 1nc

### 1nc

#### A. Interpretation - Economic Engagement is defined as expanding economic ties with a country to change its behavior – this means they have to be gov to gov

**Kahler, 6** - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (M., “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait” in Journal of Peace Research (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541, Sage Publications)

Economic engagement - a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations

####  ‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005** – (“Term: Possessive Pronoun,”

http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

### 1nc (0:38) r: 42

#### Text: The United States federal government should condition lifting all economic sanctions on Cuba on the Republic of Cuba agreeing to implement environmental regulations in Cuba

#### Conditioning the Embargo on Environmental protection solves the aff - is key to environmental leadership. Lifting the embargo alone dooms the environment.

**Connell 9** – Council of Hemispheric Affairs research associate (Christina, COHA, “The US and Cuba: Destined to be an environmental duo?” 2009, <http://www.coha.org/the-us-and-cuba-an-environmental-duo/>) //RGP

Unlike the U.S., which still has never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, Cuba signed the document in 1997, which calls for the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous interference with the global climate system. This legally binding international agreement attempts to tackle the issue of global warming and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The U.S., although a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol, has neither ratified nor withdrawn from the Protocol. The signature alone is merely symbolic, as the Kyoto Protocol is non-binding on the United States unless ratified. Although in 2005 the United States was the largest per capita emitter of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels, it experienced only a modest decline of 2.8 percent from 2007 to 2008. This decline demonstrates that the U.S. has the framework to reverse Cuba’s substandard environmental track record. By aiding Havana, Washington would be able to brand itself as an active conservationist. Such a label would enable the U.S. to create a valuable ecological public image in the international arena. The developmental assistance and economic growth potential that might stem from a U.S.-Cuba partnership might aid in developing enforceable implementation strategies. Even though Cuba’s written regulations characteristically lack feasible, implementable standards. Cuban laws, currently in effect, do provide a foundation for greater conservation activity in the future. The Cuban government does show an interest in encouraging sustainable development initiatives in the future, yet its laws are all based on maintaining a centralized government featuring a command economy. For example, CITMA appears to be trying to affect change, but many aspects of Cuba’s bureaucracy are rooted in the past and it remains difficult to update the ways of an outdated administrative substructure. If the embargo is lifted without a robust partnership and plans for environmental sustainability, the invasion of U.S. consumerism may seriously damage the island.

#### The impact is extinction – its linear

**Diner 94** – Judge Advocate’s General’s Corps of US Army

[David N., Military Law Review, Winter, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161, LN]

No species has ever dominated its fellow species as man has. In most cases, people have assumed the God-like power of life and death -- extinction or survival -- over the plants and animals of the world. For most of history, mankind pursued this domination with a single-minded determination to master the world, tame the wilderness, and exploit nature for the maximum benefit of the human race. n67 In past mass extinction episodes, as many as ninety percent of the existing species perished, and yet the world moved forward, and new species replaced the old. So why should the world be concerned now? The prime reason is the world's survival. Like all animal life, humans live off of other species. At some point, the number of species could decline to the point at which the ecosystem fails, and then humans also would become extinct. No one knows how many [\*171] species the world needs to support human life, and to find out -- by allowing certain species to become extinct -- would not be sound policy. In addition to food, species offer many direct and indirect benefits to mankind. n68 2. Ecological Value. -- Ecological value is the value that species have in maintaining the environment. Pest, n69 erosion, and flood control are prime benefits certain species provide to man. Plants and animals also provide additional ecological services -- pollution control, n70 oxygen production, sewage treatment, and biodegradation. n71 3. Scientific and Utilitarian Value. -- Scientific value is the use of species for research into the physical processes of the world. n72 Without plants and animals, a large portion of basic scientific research would be impossible. Utilitarian value is the direct utility humans draw from plants and animals. n73 Only a fraction of the [\*172] earth's species have been examined, and mankind may someday desperately need the species that it is exterminating today. To accept that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeastern shrew n74 could save mankind may be difficult for some. Many, if not most, species are useless to man in a direct utilitarian sense. Nonetheless, they may be critical in an indirect role, because their extirpations could affect a directly useful species negatively. In a closely interconnected ecosystem, the loss of a species affects other species dependent on it. n75 Moreover, as the number of species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dramatically. n76 4. Biological Diversity. -- The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. n77 As the current mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." n79 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, [hu]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

### 1nc (1:30)

**Development and economic engagement policies are economic imperialism hidden by benevolence ---this encourages countervailing forces which turn the case.**

**Veltmeyer, ’11** - Professor of Development Studies at the Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas in Mexico and Professor of Sociology and International Development Studies at St. Mary’s University, (Henry, “US imperialism in Latin America: then and now, here and there,” estudios críticos del desarrollo, vol. I, núm. 1, segundo semestre de 2011, pp. 89–123, http://estudiosdeldesarrollo.net/critical/rev1/3.pdf)//A-Berg

Finding itself in the wake of a second world war as the dominant economic power in the «free world» the US strove assiduously to consolidate this power at the level of foreign policy. Under prevailing conditions that included the potential threat posed by the USSR and the fallout from a spreading and unstoppable decolonization movement in the economically backward areas of the world, United States (US) policymakers decided on, and actively pursued, a foreign policy with three pillars. One of these pillars was a strategy of economic reconstruction of an economically devastated Europe and the capitalist development of the economies and societies on the periphery of the system. A second pillar of the post–war order was what would become known as the «Bretton woods system», composed of three institutions (a Bank of Economic Reconstruction and Development—the World Bank today; the International Monetary fund; and a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that would morph into the WTO 50 years on) and the mechanism of the US dollar, based on a fixed gold standard, as the currency of international trade.1 The third pillar was would become the United Nations—a system of international organizations designed to provide the necessary conditions of (capitalist) development and collective security, a system of multilateral conflict resolution. The motivating force behind this foreign policy was clear enough: to advance the geopolitical and economic interests of the US as a world power, including considerations of profit and strategic security (to make the world save for US investments and to reactivate a capital accumulation process). It was to be an empire of free trade and capitalist development, plus democracy where possible, a system of capitalist democracies backed up by a system of international organizations dominated by the US, a military alliance (NATO) focused on Europe in the protection of US interests and collective security, and a more global network of military bases to provide logistical support for its global military apparatus. Within the institutional framework of this system and international order the US was particularly concerned to consolidate its power and influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, regarded by policymakers and many politicians as a legitimate sphere of undue influence—the exercise of state power in the «national interest». This chapter will elaborate on economic and political dynamics of the efforts pursued by the US to pursue these interests via the projection of state power—and the resulting «informal empire» constructed by default. US IMPERIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA—FORMS AND DYNAMICS The US has always been imperialistic in its approach to national development in Latin America, but in the wake of World War II the situation that it found itself in—commanding, it is estimated, half of the world’s industrial capacity and 80% of its financial resources; and already an occupying power of major proportions3—awakened in US policymaking circles and its foreign policy establishment its historic mission regarding the Americas and also the dream of world domination, provoking the quest to bring it about in the preferred form of an «informal empire». A key strategy to this purpose was to institute the rules for what would later be termed «global governance»—for securing its economic and geopolitical strategic intents in a world liberated from colonial rule (id est competing empires). The resulting world order, dubbed Bretton Woods I by some,4 provided an institutional framework for advancing the geopolitical strategic interests of the US in the context of a «cold war» waged against the emerging power of the USSR, and for advancing cooperation for international development, a policy designed to ensure that the economically backward countries seeking to liberate themselves from the yoke of European colonialism would not succumb to the siren of communism, that they would undertake a nation–building and development process on a capitalist path. This development project required the US to assume the lead but also share power with its major allies, strategic partners in a common enterprise organised as the OECD and a united Europe,6 with a system of United Nations institutions to provide a multilateral response to any security threats (and that prevented any one country for embarking on the path of world domination via unilateral action. This was the price that the US had to pay for national security under conditions of an emerging threat presented by the USSR—soviet communism backed up by what was feared to be a growing if not commanding state power. In this context the US began to construct its empire, and it did so on a foundation of six pillars: 1. Consolidation of the liberal capitalist world order, renovating it on neoliberal lines in the early 1980s when conditions allowed; 2. A system of military bases strategically across the world, to provide thereby the staging point and logistics for the projection of military power when needed, and rule by military force when circumstances would dictate; 3. A project of cooperation for international development, to provide financial and technical assistance to countries and regimes willing to sign on the project—to provide a safe haven for US economic interests and pave the way for the expansion of capitalism and democracy, the bulwarks of US imperialism; 4. Implementation of a neoliberal agenda of policy reforms—to adjust the macroeconomic and development policies to the requirements of a new world order in which the forces of freedom would be released from the constraints of the welfare–development state; 5. Regional integration—construction of regional free trade agreements to cooperate with, and not discriminate against, US economic interests regarding international trade; 6. Globalization—the integration of economies across the world into the global economy in a system designed to give maximum freedom to the operating units of the global empire. Each strategy not only served as a pillar of imperial policy but provided the focal point for the projection of state power in different forms as circumstances required or permitted. Together they constituted what might be termed imperialism. Each element of the system was, and is, dynamic in its operations but ultimately unstable because of the countervailing forces that they generated. Within ruling class circles in the US since at least 2000 there is an open acceptance that theirs is an imperial state and that the US should maintain or act to restore its dominant position in the 21st century by any means available, and certainly by force if need be. The whole tenor of the debate in the past two decades over US foreign policy, Mann (2007) notes, is framed in these terms. In this connection, Richard Hass, the current director of Policy Planning in e State Department, wrote an essay in November 2000 advocating that the US adopt an «imperial» feign policy. He defined this as «a foreign policy that attempts to organise the world along certain principles affecting relations between states and conditions within them». This would not be achieved through colonization or colonies but thorough what he termed «informal control» based on a «good neighbour policy» backed up by military force if and when necessary—harking back to the «informal empire» of a previous era (McLean, 1995; Roorda, 1998). Mechanisms such as international financial markets and structural reforms in macroeconomic policy, and agencies such as the World Bank, the WTO and the IMF, would work to ensure the dominance of US interests, with the military iron fist backing up the invisible hand of the market and any failure in multilateral security arrangements. This system of «economic imperialism», maintained by US hegemony as leader of the «free world» (representing the virtues of capitalist democracy), was in place and fully functioning from the 1950s throughout 1980s and the reign of Ronald Reagan. In the 1990s, with the disappearance of the threat of the Soviet Union and international communism, this system of economic imperialism, bed as it was on the hegemony of «democracy and freedom» as well multilateralism in international security arrangements, did not as much break down as it was eclipsed by the emergence of the «new imperialism» based on the unilateral projection of military force as a means of securing world domination in «the American century».7 This conception of a «new imperialism», a «raw imperialism» that would not «hesitate to use [coercive] force if, when and where necessary» (Cooper, 2000), based on «aggressive multilateralism» or the unilateral projection, and strategic use, of state power including emphatic military force, was advanced in neoconservative circles over years of largely internal debate, and put into practice by a succession of regimes, both democratic and republican. It achieved its consummate form in George W. Bush’s White House, in the Gang of Four (Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleeza Rice, Dick Cheney),8 and its maximum expression in a policy of imperial war in the Middle east and the Gulf region. Although the US also projected its military power in other theatres of imperial war such Yugoslavia9 and Colombia (viz. the covert Colombia– centered class war «on subversives» against the FARC–EP’ overt regional «war on drugs») the policy of imperial war and the strategy of military force were primarily directed towards the Gulf region (see, inter alia, Petras and Veltmeyer, 2003). In the academic world the issue as to the specific or dominant form taken by imperialism has not been generally framed as a matter of when and under what circumstances military force might be needed or legitimately used (generlly seen as a «last resort» but as the necessary part of the arsenal of force available to the state, conceived of as the only legitimate repository of the use of violence in the «national interest»). Rather, the issue of armed force in the imperialist projection of military power has been framed in terms of an understanding, or the argument. That an imperial order cannot be maintained by force and coercion; it requires «hegemony», which is to say, acquiescence by the subalterns of imperial power achieved by a widespread belief in e legitimacy of that power generated by an overarching myth or dominant ideology—the idea of freedom in the post world war II context of the «cold war» against communism and the idea of globalization in the new imperial order established in the 1980s. Power relations of domination and subordination, even when backed up by coercive or armed force, invariably give rise to resistance, and are only sustainable if and when they are legitimated by an effective ideology—ideas of «democracy» and «freedom» in the case of the American empire or «globalization» in the case of the economic imperialism that came into play in the 1990s.

#### The impact is cultural extinction

**Escobar 95** - Distinguished Professor of Anthropology, UNC-Chapel Hill

(Arturo, “Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World,” pg. 52-54)//BB

The crucial threshold and transformation that took place in the early post– World War II period discussed in this chapter were the result not of a radical epistemological or political breakthrough but of the reorganization of a number of factors that allowed the Third World to display a new visibility and to irrupt into a new realm of language. This new space was carved out of the vast and dense surface of the Third World, placing it in a field of power. Underdevelopment became the subject of political technologies that sought to erase it from the face of the Earth but that ended up, instead, multiplying it to infinity.¶ Development fostered a way of conceiving of social life as a technical problem, as a matter of rational decision and management to be entrusted to that group of people—the development professionals—whose specialized knowledge allegedly qualified them for the task. Instead of seeing change as a process rooted in the interpretation of each society's history and cultural tradition—as a number of intellectuals in various parts of the Third World had attempted to do in the 1920s and 1930s (Gandhi being the best known of them)—these professionals sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to make societies fit a preexisting model that embodied the structures and functions of modernity. Like sorcerers' apprentices, the development professionals awakened once again the dream of reason that, in their hands, as in earlier instances, produced a troubling reality.¶ At times, development grew to be so important for Third World countries that it became acceptable for their rulers to subject their populations to an infinite variety of interventions, to more encompassing forms of power and systems of control; so important that First and Third World elites accepted the price of massive impoverishment, of selling Third World resources to the most convenient bidder, of degrading their physical and human ecologies, of killing and torturing, of condemning their indigenous populations to near extinction; so important that many in the Third World began to think of themselves as inferior, underdeveloped, and ignorant and to doubt the value of their own culture, deciding instead to pledge allegiance to the banners of reason and progress; so important, finally, that the achievement of development clouded the awareness of the impossibility of fulfilling the promises that development seemed to be making.¶ After four decades of this discourse, most forms of understanding and representing the Third World are still dictated by the same basic tenets. The forms of power that have appeared act not so much by repression but by normalization; not by ignorance but by controlled knowledge; not by humanitarian concern but by the bureaucratization of social action. As the conditions that gave rise to development became more pressing, it could only increase its hold, refine its methods, and extend its reach even further. That the materiality of these conditions is not conjured up by an “objective” body of knowledge but is charted out by the rational discourses of economists, politicians, and development experts of all types should already be clear. What has been achieved is a specific configuration of factors and forces in which the new language of development finds support. As a discourse, development is thus a very real historical formation, albeit articulated around an artificial construct (underdevelopment) and upon a certain materiality (the conditions baptized as underdevelopment), which must be conceptualized in different ways if the power of the development discourse is to be challenged or displaced.¶ To be sure, there is a situation of economic exploitation that must be recognized and dealt with. Power is too cynical at the level of exploitation and should be resisted on its own terms. There is also a certain materiality of life conditions that is extremely preoccupying and that requires great effort and attention. But those seeking to understand the Third World through development have long lost sight of this materiality by building upon it a reality that like a castle in the air has haunted us for decades. Understanding the history of the investment of the Third World by Western forms of knowledge and power is a way to shift the ground somewhat so that we can start to look at that materiality with different eyes and in different categories.¶ The coherence of effects that the development discourse achieved is the key to its success as a hegemonic form of representation: the construction of the poor and underdeveloped as universal, preconstituted subjects, based on the privilege of the representers; the exercise of power over the Third World made possible by this discursive homogenization (which entails the erasure of the complexity and diversity of Third World peoples, so that a squatter in Mexico City, a Nepalese peasant, and a Tuareg nomad become equivalent to each other as poor and underdeveloped); and the colonization and domination of the natural and human ecologies and economies of the Third World. [26](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/103228006)¶ Development assumes a teleology to the extent that it proposes that the “natives” will sooner or later be reformed; at the same time, however, it reproduces endlessly the separation between reformers and those to be reformed by keeping alive the premise of the Third World as different and inferior, as having a limited humanity in relation to the accomplished European. Development relies on this perpetual recognition and disavowal of difference, a feature identified by Bhabha (1990) as inherent to discrimination. The signifiers of “poverty”, “illiteracy,” “hunger,” and so forth have already achieved a fixity as signifieds of “underdevelopment” which seems impossible to sunder. Perhaps no other factor has contributed to cementing the association of “poverty” with “underdevelopment” as the discourse of economists. To them I dedicate the coming chapter.

#### The alternative is to vote negative --- rejecting imperialism in this round serves as a starting point to theorize anti-imperialism and break down hegemonic systems of knowledge.

**Morrissey 11 –** (John, Department of Geography, National University of Ireland, 2011, “Architects of Empire: The Military–Strategic Studies Complex and the Scripting of US National Security,” Antipode Vol. 43, (2):435-470, http://aran.library.nuigalway.ie/xmlui/handle/10379/2893)//a-berg

As an academic working in political geography, a key starting point of resistancefor me is the careful detailing of the largely unseen inner workings of empire in our contemporary world, ultimately in order to be better able to resist it (which is what this paper has been about). That resistance can manifest itself in counter-scriptings in a variety of contexts, from lecture halls to town halls, from academic journals to online blogs. And in a variety of public forums, many geographers have played, and continue to play, important roles in critiquing the war on terror and advancing more nuanced, reasoned and humane geographies and histories of Islam and the Middle East (Gregory 2005). Such academic and public intellectual work can also crucially liaise with, learn from, and be transformed by grassroots activists in peace and social justice movements throughout the world.44 And linking to their work in our teaching especially has more power than perhaps we sometimes realise; especially given the multimedia teaching and learning tools available today.45 A recent Antipodespecial issue saw a number of insightful reflections on the possibilities of “practising public scholarship” [volume 40(3), 2008]. The contributors outline various ways in which critical geographies can support and enable political and social activism. In addition, Don Mitchell makes an important point in reminding us thatacademic “intellectual” and “bureaucratic” work are also “vital parts of any activism” (Mitchell 2008:448). Disrupting and countering the abstracted geopolitical scriptings of strategic studies can take on a variety of forms. But both inside and outside the academy, a key intellectual task, I think, is theorizing anti-imperialism— both historically and in our contemporary moment. Effective counterdiscourses for our time must surely incorporate the lessons learned from the anti-imperial/anti-colonial struggles of history—from Ireland to India, from Algeria to Vietnam. Appellations like “insurgents” do the same discursive work today as the historical preference “rebels” did in reductively demonizing whole populations and delegitimizing their right to resistance. But more importantly, perhaps, they serve too to disengage us from unpacking the discourses and practices of contemporary anti-imperialism. Yet historical contexts of resistance have much to offer if our endgame is articulating critical and humane geographies of our contemporary world. And this is a crucial challenge, given the sheer pervasiveness of strategic geopolitical discourses that negate human geographical realities. Such scriptings are not only intellectually unconvincing; they are dangerous and hugely consequential. In seeking to avoid dangerously reductive accounts of the world, geography for me has always had a particular responsibility and strength. In understanding conflict, past and present, discourse has perpetually played a troubled role. In reading the current proliferation of “geopolitical discourse”, it is useful to bear in mind history’smultiple reminders of the impossibilities of “colonial discourse” (Morrissey 2010). There is a need to spatialize and locate the material and corporeal geographies of war; not just its imaginative geographies. The spaces and agency of resistance or so-called “insurgency” in the war on terror, for example, are little theorized and frequently not even recognized; reflecting a power relations of knowledge familiar to any student of colonial history. This remains a key challenge for critical accounts of our contemporary geopolitical world. That said, however, connectingwhat James Sidaway calls the “banal geopolitics” of militarism to its brutal consequences will always be an urgent task too (Sidaway 2001, 2008). And the dots can be joined. The military–strategic studies complex in contemporary America is a powerful producer of banal geopolitics, patronized and prioritized geographical knowledge and ultimately actionable geostrategic intelligence. Its experts and advocates are both architects of empire and apologists for its consequences. Their dominant national security discourse is about positing legitimized, aggressive US military action against the threat of irrational terrorism emanating from the Middle East; it is about presenting the USA as the guardian of global economic health; and it is about imperial ambition too. This paper has sought to expose the military–strategic studies complex as playing a central role in support of that imperial ambition and in the advancement of its aggressive geopolitics. I hope it has signalled too the imperative of resistance. In the face of ubiquitous scriptings of insecurity, war and geopolitics in our contemporary world, the task of both exposing the geoeconomic stakes and insisting on real places with real people, with bodies and rights just like us, is as urgent as ever.

### HR

#### Lifting embargo empowers Castro, causes HR violations

**López 12** (Juan J. Lopez, Ph.D. Director of Research @ Research Office (College of Arts & Sciences) at Florida International University) Implication of the US Economic embargo for a Political Transition in Cuba. Endowment for Cuban American Studies of the Cuban American National Foundation, 1998. (<http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume7/pdfs/Lopez.pdf>) (HT)

An alternative to maintaining the embargo is to lift it. It is an illusion to believe that ending the embargo will lead to greater respect for human rights in Cuba or encourage a negotiated political transition under the Castro regime. The failure of normal international relations between Cuba and countries in Latin America and Western Europe to achieve political liberalization or respect for human rights supports this conclusion. The foremost goal of the ruling elite is to perpetuate itself in power. The strategy of the dictatorship apparently is to obtain enough foreign exchange from its international transactions to muddle through while refusing to allow political liberalization. The Castro government is not willing to pay the price of respect for human rights for better international economic relations. Lifting the embargo would not mean that the Castro government would allow significant market-oriented economic reforms nor that there would be a dramatic improvement in economic performance. The Cuban government has refused to move beyond quite limited market reforms while engaging in economic relations with countries other than the United States. Yet lifting the embargo would help the Castro regime to survive. Besides handling a political victory to the Cuban government, the end of the embargo would increase the financial resources available to the regime with which to ease the pressures it confronts arising from Cuba’s economic situation. The end of the embargo would make a political transition less likely. The likelihood that Fidel would die of natural causes while in office would be greater. The current regime could last for an additional decade. Under the best outcome in this scenario, after Fidel dies a different type of regime could emerge in which a negotiated transition becomes possible. But the emergence of such a regime is not assured after the death of Fidel. It is possible that his younger brother, Raúl, the second in command in Cuba, could be able to maintain the current regime. In any event, anyone willing to bet on helping the Castro regime survive for the sake of a possible negotiated transition at some point in the distant future must not lose sight of the fact that people in Cuba have been living in hell for a long time.

#### Economic sanctions boost human rights – not the cause of violations

**Baek 8 -** J.S.D. candidate, Cornell Law School (Buhm Suk, “Economic Sanctions Against Human Rights Violations”, Cornell Law Library, April 14 2008, <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=lps_clacp)//CB>

Undeniably, these economic sanctions have had some negative effects on the targeted states. In numerous reports and articles, scholars and human rights advocates have constantly argued that economic sanctions hurt large numbers of innocent civilians in the targeted states not only by limiting the availability of food and medicine, but also by disrupting the whole economy, depriving civilians of essential income, and reducing the national capacity for water treatment, electrical systems and other infrastructure critical for health and life. The cases discussed, however, demonstrate that the sanctions forced the targeted states to accept international treaty obligations including human rights norms and modestly change their human rights policies. In most of the cases, the targeted state entered into a comprehensive agreement including the protection of human rights with the international community in order to have the sanctions ultimately lifted. What is more, economic sanctions cannot be the sole cause of civilian suffering in the targeted states. The targeted states should bear the heavy burden of responsibility for this suffering. It is undeniable that economic sanctions have inherent flaws. However, they should not be abolished because of these flaws and negative effects. The problem is not in the sanctions themselves, but in their effect. Therefore, the criticism on economic sanctions should focus on finding a way to decrease their negative effects, rather than arguing against the use of economic sanctions without providing a better alternative. In addition, in order to reduce the negative impact of broad economic sanctions on civilian populations in the targeted states, the Security Council, the U.S. and the E.U. have actively discussed a way of mitigating any negative humanitarian impact.

#### **They can’t solve ALL human rights violations so they can’t solve their large scale conflict impact**

### public health

#### Easing the embargo will collapse Cuba’s health care model

**Garrett, 10** – senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist (Lincoln, “Castrocare in Crisis: Will Lifting the Embargo on Cuba Make Things Worse?”, Foreign Policy, July-August 2010, <http://www.ihavenet.com/Latin-America-Cuba-Castrocare-in-Crisis-LG.html>)//EX

According to Steven Ullmann of the University of Miami's Cuba Transition Project, if Washington lifts its embargo, Cuba can expect a mass exodus of health-care workers and then the creation of a domestic health system with two tiers, one private and one public. The system's lower, public tier would be at risk of complete collapse. Ullmann therefore suggests "fostering this [public] system through partnerships and enhanced compensation of personnel." He also argues that officials in both governments should "limit out-migration of scientific brainpower from the country." Properly handled, the transition could leave Cuba with a mixed health-care economy -- part public, part locally owned and private, and part outsourced and private -- that could compensate Cuban physicians, nurses, and other health-care workers enough to keep them in the country and working at least part time in the public sector.¶ The only U.S. policy currently in place, however, encourages Cuban physicians to immigrate to the United States. In 2006, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security created a special parole program under which health-care workers who defect from Cuba are granted legal residence in the United States while they prepare for U.S. medical licensing examinations. An estimated 2,000 physicians have taken advantage of the program. Although few have managed to gain accreditation as U.S. doctors, largely due to their poor English-language skills and the stark differences between Cuban and U.S. medical training, many now work as nurses in Florida hospitals.¶ The Castro government, meanwhile, is in a seemingly untenable position. The two greatest achievements of the Cuban Revolution -- 100 percent literacy and quality universal health care -- depend on huge streams of government spending. If Washington does eventually start to normalize relations, plugging just a few holes in the embargo wall would require vast additional spending by the Cuban government. The government would have to pay higher salaries to teachers, doctors, nurses, and technicians; strengthen the country's deteriorating infrastructure; and improve working conditions for common workers. To bolster its health-care infrastructure and create incentives for Cuban doctors to stay in the system, Cuba will have to find external support from donors, such as the United Nations and the U.S. Agency for International Development. But few sources will support Havana with funding as long as the regime restricts the travel of its citizens.¶ In the long run, Cuba will need to develop a taxable economic base to generate government revenues -- which would mean inviting foreign investment and generating serious employment opportunities. The onus is on the Castro government to demonstrate how the regime could adapt to the easing or lifting of the U.S. embargo. Certainly, Cuban leaders already know that their health triumphs would be at risk.¶ The United States, too, has tough responsibilities. How the U.S. government handles its side of the post-embargo transition will have profound ramifications for the people of Cuba. The United States could allow the marketplace to dictate events, resulting in thousands of talented professionals leaving Cuba and dozens of U.S. companies building a vast offshore for-profit empire of medical centers along Cuba's beaches. But it could and should temper the market's forces by enacting regulations and creating incentives that would bring a rational balance to the situation.¶ For clues about what might constitute a reasonable approach that could benefit all parties, including the U.S. medical industry, Washington should study the 2003 Commonwealth Code of Practice for the International Recruitment of Health Workers. The health ministers of the Commonwealth of Nations forged this agreement after the revelation that the United Kingdom's National Health Service had hired third-party recruiters to lure to the country hundreds of doctors and nurses from poor African, Asian, and Caribbean countries of the Commonwealth, including those ravaged by HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. In some cases, the recruiters managed to persuade as many as 300 health-care workers to leave every day. Although the agreement is imperfect, it has reduced abuses and compensated those countries whose personnel were poached.¶ Cuba's five decades of public achievement in the health-care sector have resulted in a unique cradle-to-grave community-based approach to preventing illness, disease, and death. No other socialist society has ever equaled Cuba in improving the health of its people. Moreover, Cuba has exported health care to poor nations the world over. In its purest form, Cuba offers an inspiring, standard-setting vision of government responsibility for the health of its people. It would be a shame if the normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba killed that vision.

#### Do not evaluate their value system without first assessing the consequences of its actual implementation. Viewing ethics in isolation is irresponsible & complicit with the evil they criticize.

**Issac** **2002**.,( Jeffery C. Professor of political science at Indiana-Bloomington & Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life. PhD Yale University. From “Ends, Means, and Politics.” Dissent Magazine. Volume 49. Issue # 2. Available online @ subscribing institutions using Proquest. Herm

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

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#### Improving relations is impossible without reforming the entire foreign policy apparatus

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More generally, Obama’s Latin America policy is suffering from a lack of what George H.W. Bush famously called “the vision thing,” compounded by how the administration organizes the U.S. foreign policy apparatus. The president had an initial opening at his first Summit of the Americas in Trinidad, in 2009, to reset what had become a very problematic relationship between the United States and most of the rest of the hemisphere during the George W. Bush administration. Most regional leaders also made it clear they understood that, given the global financial crisis and the challenges of winding down America’s involvement in two Middle Eastern wars, Obama could not immediately pivot U.S. foreign policy to the region. ¶ But as I noted two years ago, “There was insufficient follow-up to take advantage of the momentum generated by the Trinidad meeting.” Just as candidate George W. Bush’s rhetoric about the importance of Latin America understandably evaporated after Sept. 11, the Obama administration, in continuing to react to a series of crises elsewhere in the world, has also put the Western Hemisphere on the back burner.¶ As a result, according to Sean Goforth, America’s relations with the region appear to be adrift. “Many countries want and deserve a serious partnership with Washington. But President Obama is an unconvincing partner. . . . He has stalled on trade treaties with Latin American countries that still want preferred access to the U.S. market, and he’s made it clear that his strategic priority is a ‘pivot’ toward Asia.”¶ Worse still, no senior official within the administration, starting with the president himself, has articulated a clear, compelling and convincing vision for what a Western Hemispheric partnership would look like, beyond the expected bromides about peace, democracy and prosperity. What is the desired end state? There is no lack of compelling possibilities to choose from: free circulation for people, goods and capital from the Yukon to Tierra del Fuego; a greater push for regional independence, in terms of manufactured goods, services and energy; an arrangement that mimics the pre-Maastricht European Community.

#### Ending sanctions doesn’t solve relations

**Hanson 9 -** associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org (Stephanie, Council on Foreign Relations

 “US Cuba Relations,” 4/14/2013 <http://gees.org/documentos/Documen-03412.pdf>) //RGP

Given the range of issues dividing the two countries, experts say there is a long process that would precede resumption of diplomatic relations. Daniel P. Erikson of the InterAmerican Dialogue says that though "you could have the resumption of bilateral talks on issues related to counternarcotics or immigration, or a period of détente, you are probably not going to see the full restoration of diplomatic relations" in the near term. ¶ Many recent policy reports have recommended that the United States take some unilateral steps to roll back sanctions on Cuba. The removal of sanctions, however, would be just one step in the process of normalizing relations. Such a process is sure to be controversial, as indicated by the heated congressional debate spurred in March 2009 by attempts to include provisions easing travel and trade restrictions in a large appropriations bill. These provisions passed in a March 10 vote. "Whatever we call it--normalization, detente, rapproachement--I think it is clear that the policy process risks falling victim to the politics of the issue," says Sweig.

#### Policies can’t increase soft power, and impacts are limited by security concerns.

**Blechman 5** – founder and president of DFI International Inc., a research and consulting company in Washington, DC, frequent consultant to the US Government (Barry, Political Science Quarterly, “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,” Winter 2004/2005, Vol. 119, Iss 4; pg. 680-681, proquest, accessed 07/10/07)

Joe Nye is correct. Soft power contributes importantly to the nation's ability to achieve its goals in the world. But I don't think Professor Nye would disagree that soft power also has its limitations. U.S. attractiveness to others will never be shaped fundamentally by the government, nor can it be tapped for use in particular situations. Nor will soft power be a dominant consideration in situations in which there are real differences of interest and perspective. In these cases, harder forms of national strength will continue to dominate policy choices.

#### There is no correlation between democracy and peace.

**Rosato ’3** – Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame (Sebastian, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” The American Political Science Review, November 2003, <http://rrii.150m.com/t08/Sebastian%20Rosato%20-%20The%20Flawed%20Logic%20of%20Democratic%20Peace%20Theory.pdf>)//SS

The causal logics that underpin democratic peace the- ¶ ory cannot explain why democracies remain at peace ¶ with one another because the mechanisms that make up ¶ these logics do not operate as stipulated by the theory's ¶ proponents. In the case of the normative logic, liberal ¶ democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic ¶ norms of conflict resolution and do not treat one an- ¶ other with trust and respect when their interests clash. ¶ Similarly, in the case of the institutional logic, demo- ¶ cratic leaders are not especially accountable to peace- ¶ loving publics or pacific interest groups, democracies ¶ are not particularly slow to mobilize or incapable of sur- ¶ prise attack, and open political competition offers no ¶ guarantee that a democracy will reveal private informa- ¶ tion about its level of resolve. In view of these findings ¶ there are good reasons to doubt that joint democracy ¶ causes peace. ¶ Democratic peace theorists could counter this claim ¶ by pointing out that even in the absence of a good ex- ¶ planation for the democratic peace, the fact remains ¶ that democracies have rarely fought one another. In ¶ addition to casting doubt on existing explanations for ¶ the democratic peace, then, a comprehensive critique ¶ should also offer a positive account of the finding. ¶ One potential explanation is that the democratic ¶ peace is in fact an imperial peace based on American ¶ power. This claim rests on two observations. First, the ¶ democratic peace is essentially a post-World War II ¶ phenomenon restricted to the Americas and Western ¶ Europe. Second, the United States has been the dom- ¶ inant power in both these regions since World War II ¶ and has placed an overriding emphasis on regional ¶ peace. ¶ There are three reasons we should expect democratic ¶ peace theory's empirical claims to hold only in the post- ¶ 1945 period. First, as even proponents of the demo- ¶ cratic peace have admitted, there were few democracies¶ in the international system prior to 1945 and even fewer ¶ that were in a position to fight one another. Since 1945, ¶ however, both the number of democracies in the in- ¶ ternational system and the number that have had an ¶ opportunity to fight one another have grown markedly ¶ (e.g., Russett 1993,20). Second, while members of dou- ¶ ble democratic dyads were not significantly less likely to ¶ fight one another than members of other types of dyads ¶ prior to World War 11, they have been significantly ¶ more peaceful since then (e.g., Farber and Gowa 1997). ¶ Third, the farther back we go in history the harder it ¶ is to find a consensus among both scholars and poli- ¶ cymakers on what states qualify as democracies. De- ¶ pending on whose criteria we use, there may have been ¶ no democratic wars prior to 1945, or there may have ¶ been several (see, e.g., Layne 1994; Ray 1995; Russett ¶ 1993; Spiro 1994). Since then, however, we can be fairly ¶ certain that democracies have hardly fought each other ¶ at all. ¶ Most of the purely democratic dyads since World ¶ War I1 can be found in the Americas and Western ¶ Europe. My analysis includes all pairs of democracies ¶ directly or indirectly contiguous to one another or sep- ¶ arated by less than 150 miles of water between 1950 and ¶ 1990 (Przeworski et al. 2000; Schafer 1993). This yields ¶ 2,427 double democratic dyads, of which 1.306 (54%) ¶ were comprised of two European states, 465 (19%) ¶ were comprised of two American states, and 418 (17%) ¶ comprised one American state and one European state. ¶ In short, 90% of purely democratic dyads have been ¶ confined to two geographic regions, the Americas and ¶ Western Europe. ¶ American preponderance has underpinned, and con- ¶ tinues to underpin stability and peace in both of these ¶ regions. In the Americas the United States has suc- ¶ cessfully adopted a two-pronged strategy of driving ¶ out the European colonial powers and selectively in- ¶ tervening either to ensure that regional conflicts do ¶ not escalate to the level of serious military conflict or ¶ to install regimes that are sympathetic to its interests. ¶ The result has been a region in which most states are ¶ prepared to toe the American line and none have pre- ¶ tensions to alter the status quo. In Europe, the expe- ¶ rience of both World Wars persuaded American poli- ¶ cymakers that U.S. interests lay in preventing the con- ¶ tinent ever returning to the security competition that ¶ had plagued it since the Napoleonic Wars. Major ini- ¶ tiatives including the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic ¶ Treaty, European integration, and the forward deploy- ¶ ment of American troops on German soil should all ¶ be viewed from this perspective. Each was designed ¶ either to protect the European powers from one an- ¶ other or to constrain their ability to act as sovereign ¶ states, thereby preventing a return to multipolarity ¶ and eliminating the security dilemma as a factor in ¶ European politics. These objectives continue to pro- ¶ vide the basis for Washington's European policy today ¶ and explain its continued attachment to NATO and its ¶ support for the eastward expansion of the European ¶ Union. In sum, the United States has been by far the ¶ most dominant state in both the Americas and Western ¶ Europe since World War II and has been committed,¶ above all, to ensuring that both regions remain at peace. Evaluating whether the democratic peace finding is ¶ caused by democracy or by some other factor such ¶ as American preponderance has implications far be- ¶ yond the academy. If peace and security are indeed a ¶ consequence of shared democracy, then international ¶ democratization should continue to lie at the heart of ¶ American grand strategy. But if, as I have suggested, ¶ democracy does not cause peace, then American poli- ¶ cymakers are expending valuable resources on a policy ¶ that, while morally praiseworthy, does not make ¶ America more secure.

#### All states are rational – proliferation-based crises are empirically denied

**Tepperman 9** (Jonathan Tepperman, member of the New York State bar and a Fellow of the New York Institute of Humanities, 8/28/2009, “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb”, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html> | JJ)

A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that **all states are rational on some basic level**. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price**. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable**. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button—and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time."

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#### Eurocentric history objectifies the Other – Latin America is the historical origin of American “modernity” –this o/w

**Mignolo 5** (Walter D., Ph.D. in Philosophy from the École des Hautes Études, Paris and Professor of Literature and Romance Studies at Duke University, "The Idea of Latin America," 2005, slim\_)

From the sixteenth-century Spanish missionary Bartolomé de Las Casas to G. W. F. Hegel in the nineteenth century, and from Karl Marx to the twentieth-century British historian A. J. Toynbee, all we can read (or see in maps) about the place of the Americas in the world order is historically located from a European perspective that passes as universal. Certainly, every one of these authors acknowledged that there was a world, and people, outside Europe. Indeed, both people and continents outside of Europe were overly present as “objects,” but they were absent as subjects and, in a way, out of history. They were, in other words, subjects whose perspectives did not count. Eric Wolf’s famous book title, People without History, became a metaphor to describe this epistemic power differential. By “people without history,” Wolf did not mean that there were people in the world who did not have memories and records of their past, which would be an absolutely absurd claim. He meant that, according to the regional concept of history as deﬁned in the Western world from ancient Greece to twentieth-century France, every society that did not have alphabetic writing or wrote in a language other than the six imperial languages of modern Europe did not have History. In this view, History is a privilege of European modernity and in order to have History you have to let yourself be colonized, which means allowing yourself, willingly or not, to be subsumed by a perspective of history, life, knowledge, economy, subjectivity, family, religion, etc. that is modeled on the history of modern Europe, and that has now been adopted, with little difference, as the ofﬁcial model of the US. Perspectives from coloniality, however, emerge out of the conditions of the “colonial wound,” the feeling of inferiority imposed on human beings who do not ﬁt the predetermined model in Euro-American narratives. To excavate coloniality, then, one must always include and analyze the project of modernity, although the reverse is not true, because coloniality points to the absences that the narrative of modernity produces. Thus, I choose to describe the modern world order that has emerged in the ﬁve hundred years since the “discovery of America” as the modern/colonial world, to indicate that coloniality is constitutive of modernity and cannot exist without it. Indeed, the “idea” of Latin America cannot be dealt with in isolation without producing turmoil in the world system. It cannot be separated from the “ideas” of Europe and of the US as America that dominate even today. The “Americas” are the consequence of early European commercial expansion and the motor of capitalism, as we know it today. The “discovery” of America and the genocide of Indians and African slaves are the very foundation of “modernity,” more so than the French or Industrial Revolutions. Better yet, they constitute the darker and hidden face of modernity, “coloniality.” Thus, to excavate the “idea of Latin America” is, really, to understand how the West was born and how the modern world order was founded.

#### **Democracy promotion is paternalistic and Eurocentric--provoking resentment and turns the case – this card slays the aff**

Slater, 07 - Ph.D from London School of Economics and Professor Emeritus of Geography at Loughborough University, (David, Imperial Geopolitics and the Promise of Democracy, Volume 38, Issue 6, Article first published online: 13 NOV 2007, Wiley Online Library)//A-Berg

From the nineteenth century onward — and Wilson (1901) had already referred to that century as a ‘century of democracy’ — US expansion went together with an emerging narrative that stressed the political significance of ‘self-government’3and ‘democracy’. For Woodrow Wilson, democracy supplies the ‘frank and universal criticism, the free play of individual thought, the open conduct of public affairs, the spirit and pride of community and of cooperation which make governments just and public spirited’ (ibid.: 296). Closely linked into the validation of democracy has been a belief in the importance of self-government and the need to extend it geopolitically. Wilson wrote that it is our task to ‘extend selfgovernment to Porto Rico (sic) and the Philippines, if they be fit to receive it’ (ibid.). This sense of extending self-government and the foundations of democratic politics remained relevant throughout the twentieth century(Robinson, 1996) and in today’s situation we still find a strong emphasis on the US’s perceived need to spread democracy globally. For example, the National Security Strategy for 2006 is founded upon two pillars: (a) to promote freedom, justice and human dignity; and (b) to lead a growing community of democracies. Specifically on democracy, it states that the policy of the US is to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture (The White House, 2006). This support is conditional on the kind of democratic politics encountered, so in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report for 2006, the Chávez democratic experiment in Venezuela is characterized as being populist and authoritarian and a source of political and economic instability (Department of Defense, 2006: 28). Notions of spreading self-government and democracy to other worlds were accompanied by subordinating modes of representation. For example, Woodrow Wilson, one of the most interventionist of US Presidents (see Weber, 1995), wrote that the ‘East is to be opened and transformed...the standards of the West are to be imposed upon it; nations and peoples which have stood still...are to be quickened and made part of the universal world of commerce and of ideas’. Furthermore, the US was to ‘teach them order and self-control in the midst of change; impart to them, if it be possible by contact and sympathy and example, the drill and habit of law and obedience’ (Wilson, 1901: 297–8). A sense of sympathy and example was expressed some years later by a State Department instructor who advised new US envoys to Latin America that: if the United States has received but little gratitude, this is only to be expected in a world where gratitude is rarely accorded to the teacher, the doctor or the policeman, and we have been all three...but it may be that in time they will come to see the United States with different eyes, and to have for her something of the respect and affection with which...a child looks upon the parent who has molded his character. (Schoultz, 1999: 386). Schoultz goes on to suggest, in his comprehensive investigation of US– Latin American relations, that ‘a belief in Latin American inferiority is the essential core of United States policy toward Latin America because it determines the precise steps the United States takes to protect its interests in the region’ (ibid.: xv).4 This kind of imperial mentality which is deeply rooted in US society, and is also linked internally to the treatment of Native Americans, can be juxtaposed to a dissonant stress on the validity of popular self-determination. In other words it can be suggested that a particular project of imperial power gradually emerged out of an initial anti-colonial struggle for independence from British rule so that such an emergence has given the US a contradictory identity of being a ‘post-colonial imperial power’, with the determining emphasis falling on the ‘imperial’ (Slater, 2004). The post-colonial essentially refers to the specificity of origin and does not preclude the possibility of a coloniality of power, as was exemplified in the case of the Philippines, or (it can be argued) continues to apply to Puerto Rico (Pantojas-Garc´ıa, 2005). Such a paradoxical identity has two important implications. First, one finds juxtaposed an affirmation of the legitimacy of the self-determination of peoples with a belief in the global destiny of the United States. Historically, the contradiction between support for the rights of people to decide their own fate and a belief in the geopolitical destiny of ‘America’ has necessitated a discursive bridge. This bridge has been formed through the invocation of a democratic mission that combines the national and international spheres. In order to go beyond the contradiction between an identity based on the self-determination of peoples and another sedimented in imperial power, a horizon is created for other peoples who are encouraged to choose freedom and democracy, thereby embedding their own struggles within an Americanizing vision and practice.5 Second, the primacy of self-determination provides a key for explaining the dichotomy frequently present in the discourses of US intervention where a distinction is made between a concept of the people and a concept of the rulers. Given the historical differentiation of the New (American) World of freedom, progress and democracy from an Old (European) World of privilege, class and colonial power, support for anti-colonial struggles has been accompanied by a separation between oppressed people and tyrannical rulers. For example, in the case of US hostility towards the Cuban Revolution, the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 makes a clear separation between the Cuban people who need supporting in their vulnerability,6and the Castro government which was portrayed as a tyrannical oppressor of its own people and a security threat to the international community. Similar distinctions have been made in the contexts of interventions in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989). Overall, it can be suggested that geopolitical interventions have been couched in terms of a concern for the rights of peoples who are being oppressed by unrepresentative and totalitarian governments. In this context the US is represented as a benevolent guardian of the rights of a subordinated people and an imperial ethic of care is projected across frontiers to provide one form of legitimization for interventions. This particular ethic of care can be seen as an intrinsic feature of the imperial, and although imperial power is certainly anchored in the deployment of force, equally it requires discourses of legitimization wherein ideas of care and guidance continue to play a leading role. Before expanding on questions of legitimization it is necessary to proceed with a kind of ‘geopolitical reality check’ and recall in more detail the nature of US interventions in Latin America, where, in a predominant sense, force and its institutional foundations are clearly manifest. OVERLAPPING FORMS OF INTERVENTION: THE LATIN AMERICAN CASE A discussion of the various modalities of US intervention is always needed not only to counter the official narratives of governmental truth but also as part of our attempt to nurture an alternative geopolitics of memory which, inter alia, returns the gaze on to the violence of sanctioned power. For Latin America, it is possible to identify six types of intervention which, taken together, have formed the building blocks of a generalized strategy of penetrating power.7 Terminating Elected Governments In contrast to the repeated argument that the West, and especially the United States, has been responsible for the diffusion of democracy to the Third World, it needs to be recalled that the United States has intervened to close down democratic governments that have sought to develop policies that were independent of US power. In 1954 in Guatemala, a CIA-backed coup overthrew the democratically elected government of Arbenz, who had initiated a programme of land reform which was strongly opposed by the United Fruit Company. The US preferred the installation of a military regime to the possibility of a reforming, redistributing government acting as a possible example for other Latin American societies. The coup initiated a forty-year period of state terror, death squads, torture, disappearances and executions with an estimated 200,000 deaths (see, for example,Cullather,1999;Grandin, 2004).Other interventions took place in 1965 in the Dominican Republic and in Chile in 1973 where a vibrant democratic government was replaced by the US-backed Pinochet dictatorship. In the case of Nicaragua, the Sandinista government which had won an election in 1984 — an election which was judged by independent observers to be fair and legitimate (Cornelius, 1986), was destabilized by the Reagan Administration and subsequently lost the 1990 elections. Transgressions of National Sovereignty Such transgressions, which have not entailed the over throw of democratically elected governments are exemplified by such cases as Cuba in 1961, with the unsuccessful US-planned Bay of Pigs invasion, Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. In the Panamanian example, the US invasion was codenamed ‘Operation Just Cause’ and its primary objectives were to ‘defend democracy in Panama’ and ‘combat drug trafficking’. In thirteen hours, more than 400 bombs were dropped by US war planes with an estimated 4,000 civilian deaths and over 50,000 people left homeless (Boggs, 2005: 180–1). In the case of Grenada, the Reagan Administration justified its invasion in relation to article 6 of the Rio Pact of 1947 which, it claimed, legitimized intervention when regional security was threatened by an extra-continental conflict or by any other situation that might endanger the peace of America. The US acted unilaterally in accordance with its own strategic imperatives and failed to convene a meeting of the Organization of American States as was required by article 6 of the Rio treaty. Support for Dictatorships The termination of independent, democratic governments and the transgression of national sovereignty have had their reverse side — a historical record of support for pro-Western dictatorships. In South America, military regimes in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay were not destabilized and undermined but rather supported. For example, in the case of the 1964 military coup in Brazil, the United States provided up to US $1.5 billion in financial support during the regime’s first four years (Kolko, 1988:159). In Argentina, the US gave support to the Argentinian military in their treatment of dissent, the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in conversation with the Argentinian Foreign Minister in 1976, noting that, ‘if there are things that have to be done, you should do them quickly...but you must get back quickly to normal procedures’ (McPherson, 2006: 160–1). In the case of Chile, US support for Pinochet is well-known, and Kissinger commented on the Allende government that ‘I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people’ (quoted in Schoultz, 1987: 284). Assassinations A more targeted and covert form of intervention has been that of the CIA policy of assassinations which was made illegal in 1976 only to be re-activated by President Bush in the wake of 9/11. Blum (2000) has indicated that from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s there were over forty recorded incidents of assassination plots, largely aimed at Third World leaders. In the single case of Fidel Castro, official US records have shown that the CIA launched at least eight attempts on the Cuban leader’s life in the 1960s, including attempted shootings and bombings, lethal pills and on one notorious occasion, an exploding cigar (for some details see Tisdall, 2007: 18). Disregard for International Law The policy of assassinations can be interpreted within the wider framework of a disregard for and violation of international law. The more than forty-year blockade of Cuba stands as one example of such a disregard: the strategy has been condemned by the UN, the European Union and the Inter-American Juridical Committee, which has ruled that the trade embargo against Cuba violates international law (see Chomsky, 2000: 2). In the case of US support for the contras in Nicaragua during the 1980s, the International Court of Justice in The Hague found the United States guilty of violating both international law and its treaty obligations to Nicaragua. The Court ordered Washington to stop its intervention and negotiate a reparations settlement with Nicaragua. However, after winning the 1990 elections, the US-backed government of Chamorro, under pressure from Washington, withdrew the lawsuit, the costs of which had risen to US$ 17 billion, and subsequently Washington forgave US$ 260 million in loans to Nicaragua (Holden and Zolov, 2000: 300–1). Other examples of a disregard for international law are reflected in the use of US-defined powers of extra-territorial jurisdiction (see Slater, 2004: Ch. 7) and in a reluctance to abide by international treaty obligations, as argued in the American Journal of International Law, 1998 (quoted in Chomsky, 2000: 216). More recently, the use of the naval base at Guantánamo Bay for the detainment without trial of so-called ‘unlawful combatants’ constitutes a breach of the Geneva Conventions (Rose,2004). Counter Insurgency Training: School of the Americas Based inside the United States, the activities of the US Army School of the Americas (SOA), now renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Co-operation, have a history that is relevant to geopolitical interventionism. Located at Fort Benning in Georgia the School has, since it was founded in 1946, trained more than 60,000 soldiers and police, mostly from Latin America, in counter-insurgency skills. In a recent investigation, Gill (2004) shows how the School’s institutionalization of state-sponsored violence was a key pillar in the US’s support for military rule in Latin America. Seven US Army training manuals used by the School between 1989 and 1991 were declassified in 1996; they provided instruction on the detection and suppression of anti-government political and military activities, and also contained information indicating how the US Army trained Latin American military and police officers in a variety of interrogation techniques.8It is important to recall that SOA graduates have led a number of military coups, and as Blum (2000) notes, what has also been documented is evidence of the training by the US Army of Latin American military and police personnel in the skills of institutionalized terror. These six overlapping facets of geopolitical intervention provide a glimpse of an alternative reality to the official narrative surrounding the role of the United States in the world, past and present. They can provide a source of critical analysis which brings the ‘dark side’ of North–South encounters into sharper focus. They underline the invasive effects of imperial power and help subvert the image of a beneficent America; but analytically, although they might concentrate the mind, they are not sufficient. POWER AND DEMOCRACY: A CLASH OF INTERPRETATIONS The desire to penetrate another society and help reorder that other society is a key part of the imperial project. In general imperialism may be defined in terms of the strategy, practice and advocacy of the penetrative power of a Western state over other predominantly non-Western societies, whose political sovereignty is thereby subverted. The word ‘predominantly’ is used here since I would argue that imperialism, or more specifically US imperialism, while having potentially dominating effects on other Western nation-states, is most clearly manifest in the context of West–non-West relations. The penetrative power of imperialism goes together with a determination to impose a set of institutions and values on to the imperialized society — for example, to ‘impose democracy’ (Ferguson,2005:52)—and this imposition is rooted in a lack of respect and recognition for the society being penetrated. The geopolitical will to intervene resides with the agents of power working in and through the apparatuses of the imperial state. The processes of legitimization for that will to power are produced both within the state and in civil society. In the case of the United States and its relations with the societies of the Latin South the processes of legitimization have been particularly significant in supporting its power and hegemonic ambition. Concretely in this context the aim of diffusing democracy or a specific interpretation of democracy has been and remains a key element in the justification of geopolitical power. The appeal and impact of the democratic US political system has been accompanied by an entrepreneurial economic model which emphasizes global free trade and the benefits of competition. In this sense it can be suggested that the US exports a neoliberal democratic model which represents one form of democratic politics. For Brzezinski (1997), given the fact that the US is both a globally hegemonic power and a democracy, one can pose the question of whether the projection of American democracy is compatible with a ‘quasi-imperial responsibility’. More acutely, one can suggest that democracy has an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ so that dominating power at home can lead to the corrosion of the democratic ethos that helps to sustain the consensuality of hegemonic power, whilst the intensive deployment of what Nye (2002) has called ‘hard power’ can undermine the seductiveness of the democratic promise abroad. War and militarization, together with transgressions of international law, are inimical to the health of democratic politics in general, as well as being a source for the undermining of the US-made image of democracy for export, an image which Fukuyama (2006) has called the US’s ‘benevolent hegemony’ for spreading democracy globally. In her discussion of a terrorized and privatized democracy, Eisenstein (2007) gives us a different picture. She shows in detail how the ‘war on terror’ has led to a severe erosion of democracy with the rise of an excessive and extremist politics, as is seen in White House memos on torture. Human Rights Watch documents the continual circumvention of law in the treatment of prisoners and detainees in Afghanistan, Guantánamo and in Abu Ghraib. ‘Humiliation and degradation as well as coercive interrogation are now permissible; the Commander-in-Chief is not bound by international laws; offshore and undisclosed and off-limits sites are created in which to detain terror suspects’ (Eisenstein, 2007: 54). In addition to this demise of a democratic spirit, one can point to a number of egregious contradictions concerning US foreign policy. For example, the United States justifies war for the purposes of removing weapons of mass destruction whilst holding the largest nuclear arsenal in the world; it ignores the will of the Security Council on the grounds that another nation has ignored the will of the Security Council; it threatens consequences for those who contravene the Geneva Convention, while insisting that this convention does not apply to those prisoners it holds in Guantánamo Bay; and whilst it argues for the importance of a respect for international law, it organizes the ‘extraordinary rendition’ of terrorist suspects who have no recourse to the due process s of international law. But it can be argued that rather than see these dissonances as contradictions one can posit that they reveal a logic of exception, rooted in the assumed power of a ‘global sovereign’. Thus, as Ross (2004: 26) suggests, in spite of demanding respect for the law, the global sovereign always reserves the right to act outside this law in exceptional circumstances, just as it reserves the prerogative to decide when circumstances are exceptional, as, for example, in its declaration of a war on terror in the wake of 9/11. As the exceptional power, as the guarantor of world security, US action is assured of its propriety. This also helps to explain the US perspective on exporting democracy. In the official narrative of bringing democracy to the world there is a hidden assumption that the US has the right, under circumstances chosen by the global sovereign, to spread democracy to others through the use of force. For Ross (2004: 41), ‘democratic imperialism is the claim that a democratic state has some kind of duty, as a citizen of the world, to act with the goal of ending non-democratic governments everywhere’. This is a relevant point but equally we must remember that whilst force has been used, ‘democratic imperialism’ requires a more subtle and multi-dimensional legitimization. This includes the idea that democracy is being called for, or in other words that democracy US-style is being invited by peoples yearning for freedom. Rather than democracy being imposed, it is suggested that the US is responding to calls from other societies to be democratized, so that through a kind of cellular multiplication, a US model can be gradually introduced; the owners will be the peoples of other cultures, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, who will find ways of adapting the US template to their own circumstances. What is being proposed here is a kind of ‘viral democracy’ whereby the politics of guidance is merged into a politics of benign adaptation. President Bush has expressed this idea quite clearly, noting that the US’s faith in freedom and democracy is now ‘a seed upon the wind, taking root in many nations’. ‘Our democratic faith’, he goes on, ‘is more than the creed of our country, it is the inborn hope of humanity, an ideal we carry but do not own, a trust we bear and pass along’ (quoted in Gardner, 2005: 25). At the same time, it is a specific form of democratic rule that is being projected and alternative models that include a critique of US power and attempts to introduce connections with popular sovereignty and new forms of socialism are singled out for disapproval — the Chávez government being a clear example. In the post-9/11 period, the ‘war on terror’, with its erosion of civil liberties, violation of human rights and overall diffusion of a politics of fear, has undermined the effectiveness of a benevolent image of US democracy for export. Neoliberal democracy as the universal model has come to be associated more with a bellicose unilateralism than with a seductive template for political adaptation. Here we have a key limit on the potential of US power, as ‘anti-American’ sentiment is deepened. Moreover, other democratic imaginations emanating from Latin America have been offering vibrant alternatives to the US model. Whilst the centrality of US imperial power is being challenged, there is an amplification of democratic politics (Slater, 2006). In the context of US– Latin American relations the mission to universalize a US model of democracy is being contested by a wide range of social movements and political forces. The promotion of democracy from above is being actively called into question in a continent impatient at being framed as the passive recipient. For democracy to flourish, it has to be home-grown and autonomously sustained, not exported as part of a legitimization of subordinating power. The imperative to ‘democratize’, just like the injunction to ‘globalize’, creates an asymmetry between those announcing the imperative and those subjected to it, between those who ‘democratize’ and those who are ‘democratized’. When the imperial and the democratic are brought together, a series of irresolvable tensions and contradictions emerge. The imperial relation entails, as we have briefly discussed above, processes of penetration and imposition, processes which the Woodrow Wilson perspective, for example, clearly shows are anchored in a Western ethnocentrism. Such an imperial relation requires a discourse of justification and it is here that the promise of democracy assumes a key relevance. However, the effectiveness of a democratic promise is continually subverted by the subordinating practices of the actual deployment of imperial power. Similarly, the vibrant process of democratization, in the sense of the renewal of the forms of participation, as reflected in the will and capacity of social subjects to be self-reflexive and critical of governmental authority, will always transcend democracy as a fixed system of political rule, and especially so when such a system is introduced from outside.

**Voting neg to reject US intervention in Latin America is key to interrupt the imperial underpinnings of the 1AC**

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The aim of this paper is to think differently about International Relations (IR) by thinking differently about the Americas. I write this piece as a Latin Americanist, and as such, I bring a particular geographical and disciplinary perspective to the question of power in the region, drawing on the ‘‘coloniality of power’’ perspective developed by Latin American academics. This perspective has an explicit political agenda which seeks to ‘‘place knowledge at the service of decolonization’’ as the Venezuelan anthropologist Fernando Coronı ´l suggested (2005: 148). In this way, I join a struggle against gross inequalities of power, wealth, justice, and knowledge regimes on the global (and the local) stage by reflecting on IR from an intellectual place to the south and at the periphery of conventional thinking. More explicitly, I draw together insights from critical IR and coloniality theorizing in order to consider how thinking about the USA from Latin America might not only open decolonial perspectives on the country but also suggest decolonial strategies for IR. My aim is not to criticize US intervention in Latin America––many have spoken eloquently against its government’s imperialistic foreign policies––but to propose a different, perhaps complementary, strategy which aims to disturb US global hegemony from the inside out by questioning the idea of ‘‘America’’ as a unified, unproblematic, and settled settler society. It is precisely because the USA and the worldview that it promotes are central to IR that this contributes to a decolonial IR. Two important caveats are in order before I begin. Firstly, this article focuses particularly on indigenous experiences and it does not explore the equally important dynamics of injustice, racism, and inequality that emerge from the African-American experience. There are two key reasons for this. Most obviously, it would be impossible for me to do justice to both experiences in the confines of one journal article; I find myself already generalizing about indigenous societies which are extraordinarily varied. In addition, coloniality⁄ modernity theorists focus particularly on indigenous struggles and philosophies, making this the more obvious topic for discussion. For these reasons, I have decided to focus on Native American dynamics in the coloniality of power. Secondly, as a white European, I can make no claim to write from a colonized position myself. However, as a Latin Americanist, I hope to contribute insights which are anchored in intellectual activity outside the IR core––both academically and geographically––and in particular to reflect on the decolonial possibilities that Latin America presents for IR, given its relationship to the United States. Decolonial Strategies and Insights from IR What might it mean to decolonize IR? One of the most important things that we can do, according to decolonial IR scholar Branwen Gruffydd Jones, is to question the deep political, ontological, and historical foundations of the discipline, asking how it came to be configured as it is and what sort of politics and social world it produces as a consequence (2006: 7–9). Many critical and postcolonial IR scholars have taken up this challenge, writing from and about different geopolitical and intellectual places. My purpose here is to join that conversation by drawing the ‘‘coloniality of power’’ scholarship into the discussion (along with, for example, Rojas (2007) who focuses on the question of development). This body of work is highly relevant not only because it dovetails with existing critical IR but also because it refers explicitly to experiences and power relations in the Americas. Thus, coloniality scholarship makes a double contribution because it opens a way to think differently about the USA, locating its critique at the heartland of international relationships and International Relations.

#### Use your ballot as a site to contest Eurocentric knowledge production --- they perpetuate a curriculum of imperialism --- it’s not just about debating but who has the best method for making our debates inclusive and productive.

**Baker 8**—Michael, University of Rochester, “Eurocentrism and the Modern/Colonial Curriculum: Towards a Post-Eurocentric Math & Science Education – A Critical Interpretive Review,” http://www.academia.edu/1517810/Towards\_a\_Post-Eurocentric\_Math\_and\_Science\_Education\_--\_A\_Critical\_Interpretive\_Review)//A-Berg

This essay reviews literature in science and mathematics education that assumes the possibilities for knowing the realities of the world through the official curriculum are reductively maintained within a Eurocentric cultural complex (Carnoy, 1974; Swartz, 1992;Willinsky, 1998). Eurocentrism will be described as the epistemic framework of colonial modernity, a framework through which western knowledge enabled and legitimated the global imposition of one particular conception of the world over all others. Eurocentrism is an ethnocentric projection onto the world that expresses the ways the west and thewesternized have learned to conceive and perceive the world. At the center of this ethnocentric projection are the control of knowledge and the maintenance of the conditions of epistemic dependency (Mignolo, 2000a).¶ Every conception of the “world” involves epistemological and ontological presuppositions interrelated with particular (historical and cultural) ways of knowing and being. All forms of knowledge uphold practices and constitute subjects (Santos, 2007a).What counts as knowledge and what it means to be human are profoundly interrelated(Santos, 2006). The knowledge that counts in the modern school curriculum, fromkindergarten to graduate school, is largely constructed and contained within an epistemic framework that is constitutive of the monocultural worldview and ideological project of western modernity (Meyer, Kamens & Benavot, 1992; Wallerstein, 1997, 2006; Lander,2002; Kanu, 2006; Kincheloe, 2008; Battiste, 2008). The monocultural worldview andethos of western civilization are based in part upon structures of knowledge and an epistemic framework elaborated and maintained within a structure of power/knowledge relations involved in five hundred years of European imperial/colonial domination(Quijano, 1999, p. 47). If our increasingly interconnected and interdependent world is also to become more and not less democratic, schools and teachers must learn to incorporate theworldwide diversity of knowledges and ways of being (multiple epistemologies and ontologies) occluded by the hegemony of Eurocentrism. Academic knowledge andunderstanding should be complemented with learning from those who are living in andthinking from colonial and postcolonial legacies (Mignolo, 2000, p. 5).¶ Too many children and adults today (particularly those from non-dominant groups)continue to be alienated and marginalized within modern classrooms where knowledge and learning are unconsciously permeated by this imperial/colonial conception of the world. The reproduction of personal and cultural inferiority inherent in the modern educational project of monocultural assimilation is interrelated with the hegemony of western knowledge structures that are largely taken for granted within Eurocentric education (Dei,2008). Thus, in the field of education, “we need to learn again how five centuries of studying, classifying, and ordering humanity within an imperial context gave rise to peculiar and powerful ideas of race, culture, and nation that were, in effect, conceptual instruments that the West used both to divide up and to educate the world” (Willinsky,1998, pp. 2-3). The epistemic and conceptual apparatus through which the modern worldwas divided up and modern education was institutionalized is located in the culturalcomplex called “Eurocentrism”.¶ Western education institutions and the modern curriculum, from the sixteenthcentury into the present, were designed to reproduce this Eurocentric imaginary under thesign of “civilization” (Grafton & Jardine, 1986; Butts, 1967, 1973). Eurocentric knowledge lies at the center of an imperial and colonial model of civilization that now threatens to destroy the conditions that make life possible (Lander, 2002, p. 245). From a post-Eurocentric interpretive horizon (described below), the present conditions of knowledge are embedded within a hegemonic knowledge apparatus that emerged withEuropean colonialism and imperialism in the sixteenth century (Philopose, 2007;Kincheloe, 2008).¶ Based upon hierarchical competition for power, control, and supremacy among the“civilized” nation-states, imperialism is an original and inherent characteristic of themodern western interstate system that emerged with the formation of sovereign Europeanterritorial states in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Wallerstein, 1973; Gong, 1984 ;Hindness, 2005; Agnew, 2003; Taylor & Flint, 2000). Closely interrelated withimperialism, colonialism involves a civilizing project within an ideological formation established to construct the way the world is known and understood, particularly through the production, representation, and organization of knowledge (Mignolo, 2000a; Kanu,2006). Colonialism reduces reality to the single dimension of the colonizer. Colonialism and imperialism impose on the world one discourse, one form of conscience, one science, one way of being in the world. “Post-colonial analysis leads to a simple realization: that theeffect of the colonizing process over individuals, over culture and society throughoutEurope’s domain was vast, and produced consequences as complex as they are profound”(Ashcroft, 2001a, p. 24).¶ In yet to be acknowledged ways, the Eurocentric curriculum, and western schoolingin general, are profoundly interrelated with both modern imperialism and colonialism.The persistence and continuity of Eurocentrism rather leads one to see it asa part of a habitus of imperial subjectivity that manifests itself in a particular kind of attitude”: the European attitude – a subset of a more encompassing “imperial attitude.” The Eurocentric attitude combines the search for theoria with the mythical fixation with roots and the assertion of imperial subjectivity. It produces and defends what Enrique Dussel hasreferred to as “the myth of modernity” (Maldonado-Torres, 2005b, p. 43). ¶ Western schooling reproduces this “Eurocentric attitude” in complicity with a globalizedsystem of power/knowledge relations, tacitly based upon white heterosexual malesupremacy (Kincheloe, 1998; Allen, 2001; Bonilla-Silva, 2001, 2006; Twine & Gallagher,2008; Akom, 2008a, 2008b). Eurocentrism is a hegemonic representation and mode of knowing that relies on confusion between abstract universality and concrete world hegemony (Escobar, 2007; Dussel, 2000; Quijano, 1999, 2000). Worldwide imperialexpansion and European colonialism led to the late nineteenth century worldwidehegemony of Eurocentrism (Quijano, 2005, p. 56). Eurocentrism, in other words, refers to the hegemony of a (universalized) Euro-Anglo-American epistemological framework that governs both the production and meanings of knowledges and subjectivities throughout the world (Schott, 2001; Kincheloe, 2008).¶ Eurocentrism is an epistemological model that organizes the state, the economy,gender and sexuality, subjectivity, and knowledge (Quijano, 2000). The production of Eurocentrism is maintained in specific political, economic, social and cultural institutions and institutionalized practices that began to emerge with the colonization of the Americasin the sixteenth century. The nation-state, the bourgeois family, the capitalist corporation, Eurocentric rationality, and western educational institutions are all examples of worldwideinstitutions and institutionalized practices that contribute to the production of Eurocentrism (Quijano, 2008, pp. 193-194).¶ Eurocentrism as a historical phenomenon is not to be understood withoutreference to the structures of power that EuroAmerica produced over thelast five centuries, which in turn produced Eurocentrism, globalized itseffects, and universalized its historical claims. Those structures of power include the economic (capitalism, capitalist property relations, markets andmodes of production, imperialism, etc.) the political (a system of nation-states, and the nation-form, most importantly, new organizations to handle problems presented by such a reordering of the world, new legal forms,etc.), the social (production of classes, genders, races, ethnicities, religiousforms as well as the push toward individual-based social forms), andcultural (including new conceptions of space and time, new ideas of thegood life, and a new developmentalist conception of the life-world) (Dirlik,1999, p. 8).¶ Eurocentric thinking is embedded in the concepts and categories through which the modernworld has been constructed. “The West defines what is, for example, freedom, progress and civil behavior; law, tradition and community; reason, mathematics and science; what is real and what it means to be human. The non-Western civilizations have simply to accept these definitions or be defined out of existence” (Sardar, 1999, p. 44).¶ The mostly taken-for-granted definitions and conceptual boundaries of the academic disciplines and school subjects such as “philosophy”, “math”, “science”,“history”, “literature”, “literacy”, “humanities”, “education” are all Eurocentric constructions. If Eurocentrism is intrinsic in the way we think and conceptualize, it is also inherent in the way we organize knowledge. Virtually all the disciplines of social sciences, from economics to anthropology, emerged when Europe was formulating its worldview, and virtually all are geared to serving the need and requirements of Western society and promoting its outlook. Eurocentrism is entrenched in the way these disciplines are structured, the concepts and categories they use for analysis, and the way progress is defined with the disciplines (Joseph et al. 1990) (Sardar, 1999, p. 49).¶ This hegemonic knowledge formation envelops the modern school curriculum within an imperial/colonial paradigm legitimated by the rhetoric of modernity (i.e., equal opportunity, mobility, achievement gap, meritocracy, progress, development, civilization,globalization). Western education (colonial and metropolitan) reproduces imperial/colonial, monocultural, and deluded conceptions of and ways of being in the world (Mignolo, 2000a; Kincheloe, 2008). “The effect of Eurocentrism is not merely that it excludes knowledges and experiences outside of Europe, but that it obscures the very nature and history of Europe itself” (Dussel, 1993). Understanding Eurocentrism thus involves recognizing and denaturalizing the implicitly assumed conceptual apparatus and definitional powers of the west (Sardar, 1999, p. 44; Coronil, 1996). Individually,understanding Eurocentrism may also involve the experience of disillusionment and cultureshock as one begins to demythologize the dense mirage of modernity.¶ Yet, today, in the academic field of education, “Eurocentrism” is commonlyunderstood as a cultural perspective among political conservatives who ascribe to thesuperiority of western contributions (e.g., scientific, cultural and artistic) to world ivilization that in turn justify the continued exclusion of non-European cultures andknowledges in the curriculum (Collins & O’Brien, 2003). Understanding Eurocentrism as a conservative perspective on western culture and education ignores the historical claim that Eurocentrism is the framework for the production and control of knowledge – thatEurocentrism is the way the “modern” world has been constructed as a cultural projection.For many of us educated in the western tradition – within this still dominantepistemological framework -- a Eurocentric worldview may be all we know. We may not recognize that our enlightened, liberal versus conservative, university educated ways of thinking, knowing, and being are a reflection of a particular historical-cultural-epistemological world-view, different from and similar to a variety of other equally valid and valuable ways of knowing and being (Santos, 2007; Battiste, 2008). In other words, if we are “well educated”, we conceive, perceive, interpret, know, learn about, and (re)produce knowledge of the “world” through an ethnocentric cultural projection known as “Eurocentrism” (Ankomah, 2005).¶ This review begins therefore by situating Eurocentrism within the historical context of its emergence – colonial modernity – and proceeds to define Eurocentrism as the epistemic framework of colonial modernity. From this decolonial (or post-Eurocentric)historical horizon and framing of Eurocentrism, the second part will frame and review literature on the critique of Eurocentrism within mathematics and science education that represent alternatives to the hegemony of western knowledge in the classroom. This literature was searched for and selected because it provides critiques of Eurocentrism that include specific proposals for de-centering and pluralizing the school curriculum. The review concludes by summarizing, situating, and appropriating these two school subject proposals within a vision for a post-Eurocentric curriculum. In framing, selecting, andreviewing literature that challenges and reconceptualizes the underlying Eurocentric assumptions of the modern school curriculum, this literature review adopts from critical philosophical (Haggerson, 1991), interpretive (Eisenhardt, 1998), and creative processapproaches (Montuori, 2005). The rationale for this two-part organization, as well as thetype of review this rationale calls for deserve further clarification, before analyzing the historical context of Eurocentrism.¶ Methodological and Theoretical Rationale¶ Conventional literature reviews seek to synthesize ideas as overviews of knowledge to date in order to prefigure further research (Murray & Raths, 1994; Boote & Beile, 2005).Eisenhardt (1998) however, describes another purpose of literature reviews as interpretive tools to “capture insight ….suggesting how and why various contexts and circumstances inform particular meanings and reveal alternative ways of making sense (p. 397).Following Eisenhardt’s description, this unconventional literature review is intended to situate and review an emergent literature on a post-Eurocentric curriculum within an historical analysis of Eurocentrism. A post-Eurocentric interpretive horizon is described that provides an alternative way of making sense of the curriculum literature. Eurocentric modernity is the historical context within which the modern curriculum is conceived. Mostuses of term Eurocentrism within the curriculum literature have yet to include analyses of the origins and meaning of Eurocentrism within the history and project of modernity. This lack of recognition and analysis of the historical context of Eurocentrism contributes to both incoherence and impotency in the use of this critical concept (for examples see Mahalingam, 2000; Gutierrez, 2000; Aikenhead & Lewis, 2001).¶ The concepts Eurocentrism and post-Eurocentrism offer contrasting paradigms through which the curriculum can be evaluated in relation to whether teaching and learning reproduces or decolonizes the dominant modern/colonial system of power/knowledge relations. The successful development and implementation of a post-Eurocentric curriculum is dependent upon an adequate historical-philosophical interpretation of Eurocentrism. As such, this literature review adopts elements from the critical philosophical, interpretive, and creative process approaches (Haggerson, 1991; Eisenhardt,1999; Livingston, 1999; Meacham, 1998; Schwandt, 1998; Montuori, 2005). Eisenhardt describes interpretive reviews as presenting information that “disrupts conventional thinking” and seeks to “reveal alternative ways of making sense” (Eisenhardt, 1999, p. 392, 397). Haggerson’s critical philosophical inquiry attempts to give meaning and enhance understanding of activities and institutions, bringing their norms of governance to consciousness, and finding criteria by which to make appropriate judgments (Haggerson, 1991). Montouri’s creative process model includes problematizing the underlying presuppositions of a field of inquiry along with creating new frameworks for reinterpreting bodies of knowledge (Montouri, 2005). This review does not describe and compare different perspectives. This review instead presents an alternative, post-Eurocentric framework for reinterpreting the modern Eurocentric curriculum, with a specific focus on math and science education. This post-Eurocentric framework provides an alternative way of thinking about school knowledge whereby the entire spectrum of different perspectives can be re-viewed in relation to each other.

#### Engagement requires sustained government-to-government interaction

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Can the sunshine policy really bring positive changes within the North Korean regime and peace to the Korean peninsula? The logic behind Kim Dae-jung’s policy is a refinement of one of the major strategies of economic statecraft and military competition. In his discussion of US economic statecraft towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Michael Mastanduno provides a useful framework for understanding President Kim’s engagement policy towards the North. In general, engagement promotes positive relations with an enemy as a means of changing the behavior or policies of a target government. It accepts the legitimacy of that government and tries to shape its conduct. Engagement also requires the establishment and continuance of political communication with the target. In engaging the enemy, the state sees political polarization with target or isolation of the target country as undesirable.

#### Engagement towards a government must be conditional, the plan isn’t.

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Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.